Phenomenology of Intelligence

“Also what implications does a concept of G have on philosophy of mind?”

What implications are you thinking of/what problem do you think might be raised? Are you referring to an account of the interaction of mind with the biology of the brain, or something else?

I should have said theory of mind, but philosophy of mind is also related. For example, I think an idealist view has a hard time explaining the predictions of IQ, and also I think of the issue of polylogism; we have seen class-based or racial polylogism, but I wonder what the validity of IQ-based polylogism is, that is to say that I find it an open question whether someone with an IQ of say 70 even has a “mind” unless someone posits panpsychism or something

Though we have no doubt that group differences in the propensity toward various ideologies exist, class-based or racial polylogism denies the existence of thinking and acting in these other groups whatsoever. Since all Human beings do make plans (no matter how rudimentary or simple) and anticipate that acting according to these plans will benefit them, they possess the same fundamental (and universal) logic.

The issue in this framework is a matter of sufficient social power over one’s own nature/mind (with the question of physical or metaphysical rendered immaterial). Perhaps there will be a race to “find the thresholds” for various cognitive experiences/tasks.

Perhaps for certain forms of subjective idealism (to be distinguished from objective idealism or panpsychism), if one believes that the mind can literally alter the world and defy the laws of physics — but who believes that? Or perhaps for Cartesian dualism, but we have known for long that there are strong correlations between the brain’s organic state and the content of consciousness, and that, consequently, dualists postulate a strong dependence of the soul on the brain. Nothing new under the Sun, in short. Philosophy of mind is underdetermined, as all serious theories are compatible with the findings of empirical sciences. But we can try to use armchair reasoning to discriminate them. In any case, I don’t see why we would say that someone with an IQ of 70 wouldn’t be sentient (if that’s what you mean by having a “mind”), as we should not confuse intelligence, or functional consciousness, with phenomenal consciousness. If some controversial higher order theories say that most animals are not sentient, since they lack metacognitive processes, a human with an IQ of 70 should have some of theses.